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Abstract 
 
VAT is an important but at the same time long neglected issue in social policy 
literature. The way in which taxes are levied has important implications for citizens in 
terms of equity and efficiency effects. Rate diversification is embedded in VAT 
planning across the EU, which enables Member States to address particular welfare 
objectives and tackle VAT’s regressivity.  
 
Nonetheless, for some, this undermines the uniformity and effectiveness of a pan-
European VAT system comprised of the so-called ideal single-rate VAT structure which 
could bring more money into state budgets and, thus, allow for more generous welfare 
provision.  
 
This paper evaluates arguments put forward by both sides, concluding that in times of 
crisis, where governments might advance VAT streamlining purely in order to deal with 
deficit constraints instead of fairer redistribution, the regime currently in place is the 
most pragmatic solution from a pro-welfare perspective. 
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Main Text 
1. Introduction 
 More often than not, the role of taxation-related policies is being neglected in 
the course of welfare analysis. Taxation was the centrepiece of the fiscal welfare 
category of Titmuss’s Social Divisions of Welfare, encompassing a broad array of tax 
allowances and benefits provided by the state to individuals or households. Titmuss 
himself highlighted its importance, arguing for an analysis to be undertaken to a similar 
extent as public expenditure on social policy is (Sinfield, 2013). Despite that, and as 
Orton and Davies note, “fiscal welfare has been described as forming a hidden welfare 
state, and while taxation is one of the main ways in which governments affect the lives 
of citizens, studies of welfare pay remarkably little attention to its impact” (2009, p. 33). 
It is an area that has not received much attention, particularly from social policy 
scholars, partly due to its deeply-embedded economic roots on the one hand and its not 
too straightforward, and somewhat understated, implications on welfare, on the other.  
 Even less attention was drawn to an aspect of tax policy that was relatively 
unknown during Titmuss’s era, VAT. The latter constitutes, to put it crudely, a form of 
a general consumption tax applied to goods and services. Its popularity has increased 
considerably over the last decades, supported by prominent institutions and 
organisations (Schenk, Thuronyi, & Cui, 2015). In relation to welfare, VAT –and 
indirect taxation in general- have been associated with having regressive effects, taking 
away a higher income percentage from individuals and families at the lower end of the 
spectrum (Bennett, 2012). In an early study, among the first linking indirect taxation to 
welfare, Wilensky grouped countries according to the prevalence of visible or invisible 
taxes in their systems (1976). Nonetheless, it is rare to come across an elaborate 
analysis of VAT’s potential implications. This is probably because it has long been 
considered as predominantly a business and corporate issue, something quite distant in 
terms of serving welfare goals or needs in the first place. 
 The irrelevance of VAT towards welfare might have held true in the past, but 
this is not the case nowadays, since various changes have occurred in VAT systems 
worldwide. An example of this is the EU where its founding members were among the 
frontrunners in adopting VAT. European VAT’s ever-evolving nature has resulted in 
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quite a complex regime, boasting clusters of different rates and exemptions, their 
complexity often leading to tax evasion and fraud (Terra and Wattel, 2012). This 
jeopardises VAT’s raison d’etre as a means for generating public revenue and deprives 
state from money destined to be spent on its various functions, which typically include 
welfare and social expenditure. Thus, at least for some, evolution does not always equal 
sophistication insofar as the VAT realm is concerned.   
Under such criticisms, the appraisal of European VAT’s existing welfare 
dimensions becomes necessary. It is a salient issue, in particular during the current crisis 
era, which marked the starting point of serious welfare retrenchment, even in countries 
that were traditionally considered generous social spenders (van Kersbergen, Vis, & 
Hemerijck, 2014). Evaluating EU VAT is an arduous task due to its inherent 
complexities. Is the current regime, with its rate differentiation and exemptions, an 
altruistic knight or is it a Trojan horse distorting sincere welfare considerations, that 
might have otherwise been better served by a streamlined version of VAT?  
The analysis will begin with a general overview of the EU VAT, setting its 
surrounding context and unpacking the ever-failing efforts towards harmonisation. Next 
comes an evaluation of the welfare-related arguments linked to the present state of the 
European VAT and, in particular, to the plethora of reduced rates and exemptions. This 
evaluation is based on a quadripartite framework comprising arguments related to 
vertical equity, positive externalities, labour-intensive industries, and reduced rates for 
remote geographical areas. Succeeding that, the regime’s limitations are explained 
followed by considerations for a more harmonised and uniform VAT structure. 
Reflecting on all these, the conclusion wraps up the key features of my analysis, 
drawing ultimately, that, in times of crisis, the current regime, though far from perfect, 
might be proven the most pragmatic solution regarding welfare.  
2. VAT Development in the EU and the Ideal VAT 
Structure.  
EU Member States were among the pioneers in the introduction and subsequent 
application of VAT as a successor of turnover taxes, which used to be quite popular in 
the 1960s (Terra and Wattel, 2012). In fact, the first and second VAT directives entered 
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into force as early as 1967,1 leaving the drafting and implementing of a domestic VAT 
system to the Member States’ discretion. As path dependence was prevalent, the rates 
adopted bore a striking resemblance to those previously in place under turnover taxes 
(Cnossen, 1982).  
In the meantime, harmonisation was proclaimed as the way forward for 
European integration, and, more specifically, in the case of VAT, “harmonisation … 
was perceived an integral part of achieving a common market” (de la Feria, 2009a, p. 
1). This initiated the discussions that led to the adoption of the sixth VAT directive.2 
Although progress had been made during that time, consensus was impossible to reach, 
postponing harmonisation to a future –yet unspecified- stage of the integration process. 
The Internal Market might have acted as the carrot but the potential losses were 
not harsh enough of a stick to incentivise Member States to rapidly accept a streamlined 
VAT system. In that regard, the Commission initiatives were somewhat of a failure with 
the Approximation of VAT Rates directive of 19923 being the result of a political 
compromise and proliferating rate diversification (de la Feria, 2009b). It required 
Member States to apply a standard VAT rate above 15%. simultaneously with lower 
bands, albeit with restrictions for the introduction of new ones, something still 
applicable nowadays (Seely, 2013).  
Further initiatives took place during the 1990s and early 2000s, but without 
success; to the contrary, there was a rise in VAT rate differentiation, attributed mainly 
to the labour-intensive services experiment (de la Feria, 2015). This inability to initiate 
a path departure, led to the enactment of more directives and other documents that 
attempted to consolidate VAT provisions and extended the applicability and scope of 
reduced rates (Ibid). The ongoing crisis could have been a driver for change, yet the 
Commission recently unveiled plans cementing the position of diversified VAT rates 
instead.4  
                                                 
1 Council Directives 67/227/EEC of 11 April 1967 and 67/228/EEC of 11 April 1967.  
2 Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 12 May 1977. 
3 Council Directive 92/77/EEC of 19 October 1992. 
4 Communication: Commission Work Programme 2016, COM (2015) 610 final, of 27 October 2015; 
Communication: On an action plan on VAT - Towards a single EU VAT area - Time to decide, COM 
(2016) 148 final, of 7 April 2016. 
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Despite its inherent disparities, VAT belongs to the Community’s own resources 
and forms part of the acquis communautaire of the EU, which is some sort of a paradox 
considering the absence of a unified system and the resilience of the old regime. This 
essentially means that there is a standard VAT rate ranging from 17% to 27%, but also 
either a single or a set of reduced rates from 5 to 18% depending on the Member State, a 
super reduced rate of below 5% in five countries, in addition to zero rate and/or a so-
called parking one in others for certain goods and services, as a derogation from the 
1992 directive. Moreover, VAT-exempt goods and services exist in a few countries. 
This gave ground to allegations that the established VAT amalgam in the EU has been 
transformed to a Gordian knot, jeopardising its envisaged neutral character and 
efficiency (Tutu, 2014).  
The sluggish pace of change shows that at Member States domestic politics and 
national considerations prevail. “Tax is ultimately the expression of political consensus 
and democratic debate” (Owens, Battiau, & Charlet, 2011). Amongst the arguments 
advanced for keeping rate differentiation, welfare enjoys a prime place, due to the 
seemingly socially unjust character of VAT’s neutrality. This encourages the 
manipulation of the latter’s complexities, through indirectly attributing benefits to 
certain –vulnerable- social groups (Crawford, Keen, & Smith, 2009). Domestic politics 
are indeed important; as Wasserfallen notes, following the accession of “the central and 
eastern European countries the prospects of harmonizing tax policy starkly decreased” 
(2014, p. 420), reaffirming the thesis that the more the EU grows, the less chances are 
for –VAT- harmonisation to occur. This has been somewhat accepted by the 
Commission, as its latest communications, prioritising the decentralisation of rates, 
show.5 
3. Evaluating the welfare considerations 
3.1. The VAT and Welfare nexus 
VAT is widely recognised as a rather regressive tax. This should not come as a 
surprise since its structure is intended to facilitate the collection of public budget 
revenue in a neutral, robust and efficient way. By being regressive VAT targets and 
negatively affects “those with lower disposable incomes (‘the poor’) more than those 
                                                 
5 Ibid. 
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with higher disposable incomes (‘the rich’)” (Sykes, 2012, p. 173). This comes against 
the principles of equality and fairness, core underpinnings of any social policy narrative, 
as VAT’s absolute burden is placed on poor people, particularly where a single rate 
system is the norm.  
Yet, VAT is just one of the components of taxation systems. It, often, interacts 
with the rest of the applicable taxes and it is important to concentrate on that interplay 
in order to determine the final distributional impact therein. Nevertheless, according to 
some studies, VAT’s regressivity is so pervasive that can negate many progressive 
effects of income taxation (Mahler and Jesuit, 2006). This is particularly relevant to 
industrialised developed economies. Some of the latter had to undertake tax reforms, 
triggered by the ongoing crisis and the need for fiscal consolidation. This resulted to a 
higher burden falling on the poor in both cases of VAT increases in Greece (Leventi, 
Levy, Matsaganis, Paulus, & Sutherland, 2010) and the UK (Browne and Levell, 2010). 
Despite Wilensky’s elaborate analysis on the contribution of indirect taxation in 
the financing of welfare, this remained a quasi-taboo issue, affecting governments’ 
willingness to intervene (Kato, 2003). VAT might not have such a straightforward 
impact as direct taxation, but it still entails political costs. Thus, in order to alleviate its 
perceived regressive effects, reduced VAT rates for certain goods or services in 
combination with some exempt categories were advanced, bestowing VAT with some 
moderate progressivity (Caspersen and Metcalf, 1993). This was also a surreptitious 
way to maintain the remnants of the former turnover taxes system, whose concept of 
rate differentiation was inherited by the European VAT (de la Feria, 2015).  
Assigning low and even zero rates or exemptions to food, medicine, culture and 
other goods or services was considered as a sign by the government of supporting 
equity and achieving egalitarian aims, by enabling some degree of redistribution to take 
place (Decoster, Loughrey, O’Donoghue, & Verwerft, 2009; Vermeend, van der Ploeg, 
& Timmer, 2008). Of course this is the case only if reduced VAT rates are passed on to 
consumers, something that does not always happen (Borowiecki and Navarrete, 2015). 
This system is contested through proposals for a more harmonised post-modern 
European VAT, which leaves almost no space for reduced rates (de la Feria and Krever, 
2013).  
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What follows hereinafter is an analysis of European VAT’s welfare dimension. 
The evaluative framework revolves around a typology of the core welfare rationales 
underpinning the current regime. These were construed through the key arguments 
invoked in order to support the existence of reduced rates and exemptions, as observed 
in seminal publications on the subject (Crawford et al, 2009; de la Feria, 2015; de la 
Feria and Krever, 2013; OECD 2014 to name a few). These four indicators are: vertical 
equity, positive externalities, labour-intensive industries and lower VAT rates for 
remote geographical areas.  
3.2. Vertical Equity 
The most cited indicator in terms of welfare-related goals is that of vertical 
equity a concept referring to fairness as between income groups (Decoster et al., 2009). 
It is related to the core concept of VAT being a regressive form of taxation that 
encumbers low income households the most (de la Feria, 2015). This category tends to 
include mainly food, as well as other goods or services such as medicine and healthcare, 
fuel, children’s clothing, education etc. These exhibit low price elasticity, meaning that 
demand for them does not fluctuate with the change of their price, be it downwards or 
upwards (Leahy Lyons, & Tol, 2011). Expenditure on such necessities forms the largest 
share of low income household’s budget making a case for the implementation of 
reduced rates therein (OECD, 2014).  
This has found widespread acceptance by various stakeholders, who wish for 
basic goods to remain affordable across the EU. According to a study, higher VAT rates 
on goods or services targeted to high income households could be a useful tool, both 
theoretically and practically, in order to finance and compensate for this redistributive 
scheme (Copenhagen Economics, 2007). Another one also found that “the exemption of 
food reduces inequality across all household types for all inequality measures … [and] 
… also raises social welfare in all cases except couples with no children and single 
non-retired people” (Creedy, 2001, p. 472). It is worth mentioning that even its critics 
admit that a reduced rate should be maintained for the most essential goods (de la Feria, 
2015).  
Slovakia is the most recent example of a Member State reducing the VAT rate 
on basic foodstuffs to 10% on January 1st, 2016. This is a rather interesting 
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development, bearing in mind that the country has been praised for unifying its VAT 
rate in the past, albeit with a proven increase of the VAT burden for households at the 
lower end of the income scale (Brook and Leibfritz, 2005). Slovakia follows the steps of 
the Romanian government that on June 1st, 2015 introduced a reduced VAT rate of 9% 
for essential food, which was previously taxed at the standard rate. Vertical equity 
seems to have emerged as a valid reason for lower VAT rates on essential items in those 
countries, which, up until now, followed the IMF and World Bank guidelines that 
promoted a streamlined single-rate VAT structure.  
Furthermore, consultation regarding the Irish VAT found that moving food, oral 
medicine and children’s clothes and shoes from the current zero rate to another one, 
would weigh down on low income households, with an increase of inflation between 
1,51-2,36% (The Tax Strategy Group, 2011). The same would have been the case in the 
UK, Grown and Valodia argue, with the removal of the zero rate triggering a 
disproportionate incidence in the poorest households and those without any employed 
adult (2013). As a matter of fact, the UK government confirmed the social policy 
rationale behind zero and reduced rates for food, children’s clothing, domestic fuel and 
power (Seely, 2013). 
Promoting vertical equity through reduced VAT on medicine and 
pharmaceuticals, despite their obvious welfare implications, is  more contested a 
category. The Association of Health Insurance companies in Germany has severely 
criticised the fact that the standard VAT rate is assigned to drugs, finding this a 
discrepancy in the reduced rates’ system and following WHO studies highlighting the 
price inelasticity of medicines, (Creese, 2011). Further, some countries adopt different 
VAT rates for prescription and over-the-counter items. Such an examples is the UK, 
where in 2004 retailer ASDA and the Proprietary Association of Great Britain launched 
an unsuccessful campaign, claiming the degradation of people’s welfare and wellbeing, 
by hindering those worse-off from being proactive about their health.  
Estonia saw the increase of the reduced VAT rate, which also applies to 
pharmaceutical products. On top of the regressivity argument, more area-specific ones 
were invoked, such as the burden put on the access to medicines and healthcare in 
general, as certain products might become unavailable owing to the lack of demand 
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(Saluse and Aaviksoo, 2008). On a more positive note, since the beginning of 2015 
medicine and pharmaceuticals enjoy a VAT rate of just 10% in the Czech Republic, 
benefiting from the introduction of a second reduced band for those goods perceived to 
enhance wellbeing, and which ought to be affordably available to all.  
3.3. Positive Externalities 
Another category is that of positive externalities and merit goods. According to de la 
Feria and Crever, “it is based on the alleged benefits of subsidizing particular types of 
consumption that yield positive externalities, with [reduced rates and] exemptions seen 
as a way of increasing consumption of so-called merit goods” (2013, p. 22). This might 
not seem prima facie as a welfare goal, but if an expansive definition of welfare is 
employed, the topic becomes quite relevant. It essentially comprises the majority of 
culture, sport and environment-related sectors, goods, services and events (de la Feria, 
2015). Setting reduced rates on these correlates with the theory that the market cannot 
internalise their externalities, thus impeding their effective circulation and allocation 
(Borowiecki and Navarrete, 2015). This is precisely the reason why states intervene 
through their fiscal policies, including VAT planning, to try and tackle such 
complications.  
Reduced VAT rates should eventually lead to lower prices, thus rendering the 
goods or services-in-question more affordable for poorer households, enabling the latter 
to actually benefit from such products, which can improve their educational level and 
reduce health and/or environment-related costs (Copenhagen Economics, 2007). An 
empirical example upholding that theory can be drawn from Sweden, where books 
taxed at the standard VAT rate where in low demand until 2001, when the government 
decided to include them in the reduced band. The outcome boosted book sales, as the 
VAT reduction was almost totally reflected in the price, allowing the state not to 
provide subsidies for bookstores in remote areas anymore (Ahlmark, 2003).  
On the other hand, the same did not happen in Slovakia. There, the decrease of 
the applicable VAT rate from 19% to just 10% was not enough to drive demand, 
possibly because of the low levels of overall household income. This contradicts a 
cross-country EU study, which found that, usually, low VAT rates on books equal lower 
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prices and drive consumption of these goods up, reaffirming the rationale behind their 
inclusion in the reduced rates’ regime (Borowiecki and Navarrete, 2015).  
Another merit good that also generates positive externalities is news production 
(van der Wurff, 2012), which, with very few exceptions, either belongs to the reduced 
rates’ group or is VAT-exempt. In 2009, the Danish Ministry of Culture published a 
report on the issue, stating that if VAT on newspapers was increased, then consumers 
would bear the costs of a subsequent price hike (Ramboll Management Consulting, 
2009). In the UK, the severe consequences of a potential VAT rate increase was the 
subject of some older studies, concluding that if this was to happen, then most regional 
newspapers would disappear and there would be a considerable fall in sales of national 
dailies (De Bens and Oestbye, 1998).  
Regarding cultural events, in the Netherlands the VAT on theatre tickets 
increased by 13% in 2011, culminating in higher prices, and, subsequently in a sales 
drop, although the latter could be attributed to the general recession climate of the early 
2010s (Borowiecki and Navarrete, 2015); the rate reverted back to 6% the following 
year. In a crisis-hit state, Spain, a VAT hike from 8 to 21% took place in 2013, with 
spectators numbers falling and jobs in the industry lost, showcasing the negative effects 
of fiscal austerity and the need for VAT differentiation therein. 
Environment-related uses of VAT have turned it into a green form of taxation. 
By allocating reduced rates to energy-saving materials, those could become more 
accessible to the masses, alleviated a country’s climate concerns and uplifting the 
welfare of its citizens. That was the rationale behind UK’s Green Deal programme, 
which was, nonetheless, struck down by the CJEU.6 The social policy clauses of the 
VAT directive were invoked by the UK to justify the reduced rates applicable, but to no 
avail.  
3.4. Labour-intensive industries 
The third category is that of labour-intensive industries. To a lesser extent it also 
includes locally supplied services as well as goods and services with high price 
elasticity. Its underpinning rationale comes from the negative impact higher VAT rates 
                                                 
6 Case C-161/14 Commission v UK Report not yet published. 
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would have on employment. Carbonnier’s French VAT study shows that prices change 
more dramatically here compared to merit goods (2005). It is a fairly recent addition at 
EU VAT planning, as. it was not until 1999 that the Council, through the so-called 
labour-intensive experiment, allowed Member States to apply reduced rates to an 
exhaustive list of such services on an optional basis.7 Despite the dubiousness of its 
results, reduced VAT rates for the said category became permanent in March 2009.  
A report found this category more justifiable on the basis of such services being 
substitutes for do-it-yourself activities, the reliance on which, if encouraged, would 
detrimentally affect market economy by diminishing the job opportunities for services 
such as hairdressing, minor repairs and domestic care (IFS, 2011; Copenhagen 
Economics, 2007). Market distortion can also happen by encouraging labour-intensive 
activities to move to the informal economy in order to evade high VAT rates (CFE, 
2008). Furthermore, the resources of high-skilled individuals could be shifted to low-
skill tasks, thus jeopardising market efficiency (Sørensen, 1997) and depriving them of 
their free time (OECD, 2014).  
The two-fold aims of the application of reduced rates on this sector, namely to 
increase employment and confine informal economy, seem to have been attained in the 
case of the Isle of Man. A government report praised the success of a scheme mainly 
targeting housing and construction, which generated a higher tax take for the authorities, 
happier customers and improved profitability for the industry overall (Isle of Man 
Government, 2003). Interestingly enough, the UK never endorsed the idea of reduced 
rates for labour-intensive industries, being sceptical about their effectiveness (Seely, 
2011).  
The more encompassing Jobs Initiative in Ireland, initiated in 2011, has been 
fruitful in both passing through the VAT cut in most cases, and increasing employment 
at the same time (O’Connor, 2012). Another successful case are domestic services in 
France, which more than doubled between 1994-2004 partly due to their inclusion in the 
reduced VAT band (DARES, 2006). Portugal and Spain lowered restaurant VAT in 
2016, in order to boost their labour markets. 
                                                 
7 With Council Directive 1999/85/EC of 22 October 1999. 
14 
 
Another sector of labour-intensive industries is hospitality. Countries with high 
VAT rates there are less competitive, leading to problems not only for the hospitality 
industry, but for state budget as well, if a country’s revenue heavily relies on tourism. 
The various newly-implemented VAT hikes in those areas in Greece might adversely 
impact its offering. An EU study, focusing primarily on the amusement park sector, but 
also on the hospitality industry in general, found that the introduction of lower rates 
provided women, young, unskilled and semi-skilled workers with opportunities of either 
full or part-time employment (IAAPA, 2014). Accordingly, reduced VAT rates 
essentially help to promote labour market activation and, thence, somewhat address 
certain of the so-called new social risks.  
On a final note, the negative impact of high VAT rates on labour-intensive 
services is more pertinent to Member States with high levels of marginal income tax, 
such as Sweden. The combination of high rates on both creates an additional burden for 
high-income earners that impedes them from extensively consuming all available 
services, thus decreasing demand and, consequently, employment opportunities therein 
(OECD, 2011).  
3.5. Additional rationale: Remote areas 
Aside from the established categories explained supra, there can be additional 
social reasons for a Member State to adopt reduced rates. These, rarely figure in the 
relevant scholarship, as they are not as widespread as the other three. Amongst them, 
the paradigm of remote areas enjoying a privileged VAT regime involving reduced 
rates, is the most consistent one in encapsulating welfare considerations. As Kitchen 
and Slack note, “governing remote areas raises different issues than governing urban 
areas because of the small size of the population, the lack of concentration of 
population, and the high cost of living” (2006, p. 123).  
Low levels of employment and income make fiscal governance difficult, as the 
fiscal base is fairly weak, and VAT’s regressivity could potentially hit the population of 
those areas the hardest, impacting their already asthenic levels of welfare and wellbeing. 
Reduced VAT applied to most of the Aegean Islands in Greece, but is to be scrapped 
due to the country’s third bailout, much to the uproar of the region’s residents. A similar 
provision exists for Corsica in France, which also benefits from rates even lower than 
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the mainland, in order to counterbalance the island’s additional costs and market 
inefficiencies (Nicolai, 2010). The rationale bears similarities to vertical equity albeit 
taking into account the geographical peculiarities of those cases. 
4. Limitations 
Despite its positive impact on social policy, the regime in place certainly cannot 
be characterised as flawless. Its core limitations emanate in principle from the 
regressivity of VAT, which policy makers try to tackle through the introduction of 
reduced rates and exemptions, at the expense of its efficiency. Rate differentiation can 
impede VAT’s optimal collection, and provide considerable fraud opportunities through 
the misclassification of products, thus potentially wounding public revenue allocated to 
social policy (Keen and Smith, 2006). Such views, conform to Ballard, Scholz, & 
Shoven’s argument that a diversification of VAT rates, ends up producing a welfare loss 
compared to uniformity (1987). Empirical evidence from Italy attests that its VAT 
system became more redistributive when it abolished a rate band, underlining that 
“reducing the number of VAT rates may be desirable even in the presence of 
distributional concerns” (Liberati, 2001, p. 47). A French study found ‘efficiency gains 
from reducing the gap between the full and reduced rates of VAT’ (André et al, 2015, p. 
446).  
Moreover, in countries with progressive income taxation and social security 
systems, any effort to tackle VAT regressivity by adopting a diversified rate structure 
may actually hinder the others’ progressivity, rendering the whole concept inefficient 
towards welfare. In the following paragraphs, the focus of my analysis falls on the the 
limitations of the regime, shedding light on certain unsuccessful experiments and on the 
counter-argument refuting the thesis that rates’ diversification leads to significant 
welfare gains. 
Vertical equity reasons, while explanatorily the most reasonable in justifying 
reduced rates, are not completely unproblematic. The food sector can become a 
complicated landscape without convergence as to which products shall have reduced 
VAT, raising compliance costs (Copenhagen Economics, 2007). In some instances, 
such as goods high in sugar, people’s wellbeing has been invoked for them to be on the 
standard rate, turning VAT into a quasi-sin tax, yet disregarding that poor are the ones 
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hit the hardest by this choice (Snowdon, 2013). Consensus among Member States on 
framing an appropriate vertical equity category of goods or services is lacking, thus, 
crippling uniformity efforts and promoting an unequal VAT treatment of the same 
product across the EU (OECD, 2014). As if this was not enough, high income 
households also benefit from the lower rates quantitatively more compared to poorer 
ones.  
Notwithstanding that, low-income households still gain substantially in 
proportion to expenditure, since “they spend a significantly larger share of their income 
on food” (Copenhagen Economics, 2007, p. 30). Yet regarding pharmaceutics, in some 
countries low income households have been replaced by middle income ones in 
benefitting the most in proportion to expenditure (OECD, 2014). Ireland experimented 
by cutting the standard VAT rate by 1% for vertical equity reasons, but after a year it 
backtracked, stating the cut had not been passed through (de la Feria, 2013). Removing 
reduced rates and providing low income households with direct transfers has been, 
therefore, proclaimed by various actors as a more efficient and socially just choice 
(OECD, 2010a). Crawford et al consider the current regime extremely weak and 
associate its persistence with the inability of politicians to ‘market’ any viable 
alternative (2009).   
Things seem to be rather contentious regarding positive externalities and merit 
goods. An OECD study alerts that reduced rates on such goods or services might 
actually subsidise more their consumption by high-income households, instead of 
raising demand by poorer ones, leading to “a so-called ‘Mattheus effect’ according to 
which social distribution flows from lower-income households to higher-income 
households” (OECD, 2010b, p. 87). Regarding reduced VAT rates on newspapers, Kind 
and Moeen, argue that most studies favouring the current rate structure neglect to 
empirically ascertain the duality of the markets in which newspapers operate. (2015 
Furthermore, another OECD study concluded that in the case of energy-efficient 
appliances, reduced VAT rates might lead to more sales of goods, which are otherwise 
energy-intensive and whose increased consumption may entail severe environmental 
repercussions (OECD, 2010c). In the UK, most new build is zero rated, whereas repairs 
and regeneration is mostly taxed in full, negatively impacting the ecology and cultural 
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heritage of an area. In general, merit goods are considered the category the easiest to be 
abolished, following its anaemic underlying justifications. Portugal and Spain have 
already eliminated it (de la Feria, 2015). In Greece energy is about to move to a higher 
band, albeit books and theatre admissions will remain at the lowest rate. Such reforms 
materialised in countries under financial assistance programmes, which implies that 
they might be an outcome of EU’s conditionality strategy rather than a pure VAT-
streamlining initiative (Sacchi, 2015).  
Regarding the labour-intensive sector, critics tend to refer to the disappointing 
results some of the past experiments have produced. The problem lies in the fact that 
when a reduced VAT rate is introduced, the price cut often does not correspond to the 
actual VAT rebate, thus not fueling demand. Two studies in Finland confirm this; the 
first dealt with the VAT cut on hairdressers (Kosonen, 2010), while the second with the 
restaurant industry (Harju and Kosonen, 2014). Both showed little reduction in prices 
and no effect whatsoever on either the demand or the employment levels therein. Large-
scale transnational studies uphold the limited impact of reduced VAT rates on 
employment in these industries, blaming the inelastic demand that permeates them 
(European Commission, 2003 and OECD, 2011).  
The homogeneity in the responses emanating from the different studies does not 
help to rebut their statements. As if this was not enough, OECD contested the reduced 
rates applying to the restaurant sector, claiming that high-income households far 
outweigh poorer ones in terms of restaurant expenditure (OECD, 2014). Vermeend et al 
argue that a reduction of direct taxes on labour could be 52% more effective than lower 
rates in addressing VAT’s adverse effects on employment (2008). Further, reduced rates 
for labour-intensive industries, might trigger a downward harmonisation of VAT rates, 
with severe consequences for state budgets and welfare expenditure (Leibfried, 2015). 
Although a bit far-fetched, this would mainly impact the Nordic welfare states, such as 
Denmark, which finance their generous welfare spending predominantly through high 
indirect taxation (Hagen, Norrman, &  Sørensen, 1998).  
 Another limitation of the scheme lies in the complexity of classifying what falls 
under reduced rates or is exempt. This might hamper the competitiveness of welfare-
related organisations, especially if they belong to the private or third sector. For 
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example, the construction of a nursing home in the UK can be VAT exempt under 
certain conditions, namely the provider being a charity, a public body or state-regulated. 
Conversely, if private providers do not conform to any of these typologies, they will 
have to entail higher costs, and thus be less competitive, unless their services are 
contracted-out to local authorities. Otherwise, welfare users would have to incur higher 
charges due to the VAT passing on to them (Hall, 2014).  
Such rationales actually hinder welfare provision by distorting the welfare mix. 
People who can no longer afford private providers would have to resort to the state, 
elevating the associated costs for state provision. Moreover, private actors would 
encounter inadequate fiscal opportunities to become welfare providers on their own and 
equally compete with their public counterparts (Taylor-Gooby, 2013). The paradox of 
VAT rate diversification also exacerbates the education landscape in England, where 
sixth-form colleges are treated differently to secondary schools (HM Government, 
2015). This depicts a farcically arbitrary system that whimsically classifies similar 
establishments in separate bands.  
5. Is harmonization a viable solution at times of crisis? 
At this point one might suggest that an overhaul is overdue. Cnossen has 
advocated for that since the late 1990s, by putting forward the solution of a uniform 
VAT rate, following the paradigm of New Zealand (1998). This is backed by both a 
notable part of the academic community (Creedy, 2011; de la Feria and Crever, 2013) 
together with several international organisations (OECD, 2014); for them incorporating 
welfare considerations in VAT planning simply fares badly. Instead, they support VAT 
harmonisation across the EU, with domestic systems mitigating any negative welfare 
effects through other forms of taxation, such as direct or wages taxes (Levell, Roantree, 
& Shaw, 2015). 
Of course harmonisation and uniformity do not come without pitfalls. According 
to the Europeanisation literature, compliance levels among Member States vary, 
meaning that at least during the first stages of a pan-European VAT implementation 
process disparities would be prevalent among country clusters (Falkner and Treib, 
2008). This could be attributed to various factors inside a Member State that might lead 
to a misfit between the envisioned project and reality (Treib, 2006). The most important 
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among them is either the low reform capacity of a country (Heritier et al., 2001), or 
certain institutional veto players, who may block willing governments from realising 
their agendas (Haverland, 2000; Tsebelis, 2002). In turn, this is even more likely to 
happen in policy-making, whose inherent complexities tend to deter the launch of 
ground-breaking ventures (Stevens, 2011), but also whenever national sovereignty 
‘feels threatened’ by supranational initiatives, particularly if fiscal policy is concerned 
(Enderlein Funke, & Lindner, 2015). 
In the relevant section, I briefly explored the failed attempts towards VAT 
harmonisation in the EU, showing a strong path dependence. Nonetheless, even if 
harmonisation became reality, a series of different problems would emerge, particularly 
in regards to the current crisis that calls for welfare retrenchment, as part of the general 
cutbacks on public spending (Greve, 2012). Subsequently, what has long been 
considered as the social acquis of many European countries is now constantly being 
eroded. In a retrenchment period it is doubtful that measures enhancing progressivity 
would be enacted. Instead VAT rates are constantly increasing coupled with extended 
cuts in social expenditure, exacerbating regressivity in lieu of trying to make up for it 
(Irvin, 2013). Under such climate where upwards social mobility is halted, VAT 
remains regressive life-long, despite affirmations to the contrary (Levell, Roantree, & 
Shaw, 2015); pro-uniformity studies rarely adequately tackle the regressivity question. 
Things, thus, would look bleaker if VAT was streamlined. Different countries, in 
the absence of a common EU social policy, compensate their poor differently, making it 
dubious that low income households would come unscathed after a suppression of the 
reduced rates. Things become even more unsettling if one takes into account the shift 
towards neoliberal practices as the general direction an increasing number of Member 
States is adopting in regards to welfare (Featherstone, 2004). In Ireland VAT 
streamlining took place at the same time as the intensification of the liberal 
characteristics of the Irish welfare state (Dukelow, 2011). A similar direction was 
followed in the majority of the crisis-hit Member States around the Mediterranean. A 
point has been reached where harmonisation rather than leading to a fairer redistribution 
through higher government revenues, might be more of a tool in solving public deficit-
related issues, whilst advancing the neoliberal project through VAT’s regressivity 
(Cooper et al, 2010). 
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6. Conclusion 
After having evaluated the current EU VAT regime, it becomes obvious that it is 
far from perfect. While welfare is undoubtedly a goal therein, and such direction was 
followed in the planning process, this is not without the constraints set out supra. All 
rationales behind preserving the various reduced rates and exemptions centred around  
vertical equity, positive externalities and labour-intensive industries seem to serve social 
policy well. It could be argued that they incorporate a sound rationale justifying the 
existence of rate diversification in the EU, by trying to counterbalance most of the 
regressivity that VAT displays.  
Nevertheless, the VAT rate structure that is in place comes with a series of 
limitations, distorting its function. What seems to be common among them is that, in 
general, high-income households having the highest purchasing power tend to benefit 
quantitatively more. This de facto weakens some of the progressivity assumptions 
entrenched to the current regime. Yet it should not detract someone from the more 
socially meaningful progressive effects reduced rates and exemptions display towards 
poorer households. Another alleged problem is the high compliance costs associated 
with the complexity of classifying something among numerous VAT bands. Overall, the 
European VAT system is a multi-level oxymoron; even though it tries to be fair and 
redistributional this does not come without considerable efficiency costs.  
Despite its limitations, this oxymoron might as well be the structure that best 
advances welfare considerations in VAT. After having briefly contemplated on its 
potential alternatives under the ongoing global developments, insofar as social policy is 
concerned, the current regime, with the embedded rate diversification and list of 
exemptions, remains the most realistically viable solution. And it is a pragmatic solution 
for welfare, not only for the reasons described here, but also because it has been proven 
as an acceptable political solution against VAT’s regressivity. For what it is worth, no 
comparable alternative has been put forward yet. People and –some- policy-makers 
alike perceive it as serving a moderately pro-poor policy (Alt, Preston, & Sibieta, 2009).  
It is easy for individuals to acknowledge that they directly benefit from the 
application of reduced rates. Thence, VAT rate differentiation gains simultaneously its 
political and social endorsement, both necessary for its uninterrupted implementation. 
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That does not mean that rethinking the current regime is out of the question. Ideally, a 
streamlining of the various rates in order to reduce their complexities and compliance 
costs shall happen, yet without neglecting the interests of poorer households protected 
by maintaining the lower bands. After all, despite its shortcomings, the European VAT 
has welfare considerations at its heart, safeguarding those in need from its negative 
repercussions. The fact that high income-earners might also benefit shall not undermine 
lower rates’ social function. When the core question revolves around little or no 
welfare, it is better to try and shelter what is left of it. VAT planning –in the EU and 
elsewhere-  should follow that direction.  
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